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INTRODUCTION
Junk removal services have sprouted up across the country
given the robust market for cleaning or "trashing-out" fore-
closed properties over the past few years.' It is a sad job of rum-
maging through a family's belongings. The things left behind
paint a faded picture of the residents' former lives. Turner, who
oversees one such service, says he remembers going into one
house and seeing the children's report cards still stuck to the
refrigerator: "They evidently had a young female, who I think
was in elementary school. It was straight A's and B's, and it was
still prominently displayed there with a magnet. And you think,
'Wow, they didn't even have time to grab this,' or maybe it was
just an oversight." 2 This is the gloomy landscape of the nation's
housing crisis - waist-high lawns, overfilled gutters, clogged
drains, leaking pipes, and lots and lots of junk left behind by
families who either didn't have time to pack or just didn't care.
Every 13 seconds in America, there is another foreclosure fil-
ing.3 There are more than 6,600 home foreclosure filings a day,
with Florida having the nation's highest rate of homes - 23% -
either in foreclosure or delinquent on mortgage payments in the
second quarter of 2009. 4 As of the end of December 2010, the
foreclosure crisis has claimed more than five million American
homes, about 10% of all homes with a mortgage. 5 The national
1 See Robert Lopez, Trash-outs tells stories of loss, NEWS & RECORD (Sept.
20, 2009), http://www.news-record.com/content/2009/O9/18/article/trashouts_
tellstories of loss.
2 Julian Hattem, Junk Removers Find Heart-Breaking Wreckage In Fore-
closed Homes, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Sept 23, 2009), http://www.huffing
tonpost.com/2009/09/23/junk-removers-find-heart n 296502.html.
3 Tom Brown, Foreclosures mark pace of enduring U.S. housing crisis,
REUTERS (Oct. 8, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/id
USTRE59705J20091008.
4 Id.
5 Faces of the Home-Foreclosure Crisis, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 29, 2010), availa-
ble at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870461090457603163283
8153532.html.
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discussion on the foreclosure crisis has largely been focused on
home owners and financial institutions, but recent analysis
reveals that the crisis is also significantly impacting renters
across the country. 6 These renters are innocent victims of the
foreclosure crisis, who lose their homes through no fault of their
own when their landlord enters foreclosure. According to the
National Low Income Housing Coalition ("NLIHC"), an esti-
mated 40% of the households that have lost their homes to fore-
closures are inhabited by renters.7
Until recently, tenants caught up in foreclosure have been
summarily evicted with little or no notice,8 because in foreclo-
sure proceedings, all subordinate leases and interests, including
rental agreements, are extinguished when the superior interest
holder (mortgagee) takes over.9 To address this problem, the
Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009 ("PTFA") was
signed into law on May 20th, 2009.10 The new law provides for a
90-day notice requirement, and subjects any immediate succes-
sor of a property in foreclosure to existing bona-fide leases.1
The PTFA marks the first national step in recognizing and alle-
viating some of the problems associated with tenants at foreclo-
sure. While the Act's sunset provision has been amended to
expire in 2014,12 the Act is still deficient in several respects. This
6 See Vicki Been & Allegra Glashausser, Tenants: Innocent Victims of the
Nation's Foreclosure Crisis, 2 ALB. GOV'T L. REV. 1 (2009).
7 Renters Have Immediate Protections from Foreclosure Under New Bill, NA-
TIONAL Low INCOME HOUSING COALITION (May 20, 2009), http://www.
nlihc.org/detail/article.cfm?article-id=6140&id=48.
8 See Kelly Noble, "Something Wicked This Way Comes": Revising Rhode
Island Law to Require Notice to Tenants in Foreclosure. 14 ROGER WILLIAMS
U. L. REV. 328, 328 (2009).
9 Id. at 342.
10 Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 111-22, §§ 701-704
(2009) [hereinafter PTFA].
11 PTFA § 702.
12 The PTFA's sunset provision was extended from 2012 to 2014 under the
Dodd-Frank Bill, which was signed into law on July 21, 2010. See Kerry
Curry, Dodd-Frank Reform Bill Extends Tenant Act through 2014, Hous-
INGWIRE (Jul. 21, 2010), http://www.housingwire.com/2010/07/21/dodd-frank-
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comment attempts to outline some of the PTFA's deficiencies,
and recommends further action at the federal, state, as well as
local level on behalf of tenants (and banks) at foreclosure.
Part I of this comment provides a background to the foreclo-
sure crisis. It outlines the historical deregulation of consumer
credit markets and other factors leading up to subprime loans
and debt defaults. Part II of this comment discusses the new leg-
islation in more detail. It analyzes what the increased protection
means for tenants and banks, who, in most cases, are the imme-
diate successors of a foreclosed property. This section of the
comment also touches upon the constitutionality and legislative
intent of the Act, as well as procedural concerns in its imple-
mentation. Part III of the comment addresses several deficien-
cies of the PTFA - namely, the lack of general knowledge
regarding the Act, the incapacity for tenants to exercise their
rights, and the absence of any real enforcement mechanisms for
violations of the law. Part IV looks to various programs
throughout the country and suggests that local, state, and fed-
eral governments, as well as non-governmental entities, should
go further than the PTFA in protecting tenants at foreclosure.
I. THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS
The U.S. foreclosure crisis has been called the "worst financial
crisis since the Great Depression."'13 The International Mone-
tary Fund estimated that top U.S. and European banks have lost
more than $1 trillion on toxic assets14 and bad loans from 2007
reform-bill-extends-tenact-act-through-2014; Diana Golobay, Turning to Te-
nants to Mitigate Foreclosure Losses, HOUSINGWIRE (Jan. 20, 2009), http://
www.housingwire.com/2009/01/20/turning-to-tenants-to-mitigate-foreclosure-
losses.
13 Jon Hilsenrath, Serena Ng, & Damian Paletta, Worst Crisis Since '30s,
With No End Yet in Sight, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 18, 2008), available at http://
online.wsj .com/article/SB 122169431617549947.html.
14 The term " toxic asset" describes financial assets whose value has fallen
significantly and for which there is no longer a functioning market. "Toxic"
has been used to describe the high-risk mortgages for the last two years. The
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to 2009.15 The foreclosure crisis has been characterized as a two-
pronged attack on the U.S. economy. I6 On the one front, the
rise in default and foreclosure affects homeowners, neighbor-
hoods, lenders and the real estate industry directly. 7 On the sec-
ond front, the rise in default and foreclosure has created a
domino effect in the financial market, 18 culminating in bank fail-
ures and an illiquid credit market. 19 The cause of the economic
breakdown is a complex question and experts have disagreed on
how much weight to give to various explanations. 2° This com-
term may have been coined by Angelo R. Mozillo, founder of Countrywide
Financial Corporation. See Tom Petruno, Mozil knew hazardous waste when
he saw it. L.A. TIMES (June 4, 2009), available at http://latimesblogs.latimes.
com/money-co/2009/06/the-use-of-toxic-to-describe-high-risk-mortgages-has-
been-de-rigueur-for-the-last-two-years-now-it-looks-like-countrywide.html.
15 FACTBOX-U.S., European bank writedowns, credit losses, REUTERS
(Nov. 5 2009, 11:55 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/marketsNews/id
CNL554155620091105?rpc=44.
16 See JOHN TATOM, THE U.S. FORECLOSURE CRISIS: A TwO-PRONGED As-
SAULT ON THE U.S. ECONOMY (2009), available at http://www.networksfinan
cialinstitute.org/Lists/Publication %20Library/Attachments/120/2008-WP-10-
Tatom.pdf.
17 Id. at 2.
18 Asset pricing is forward looking, in that buyers and sellers of financial
instruments base asset values on the future cash flow expected from assets
based on today's estimates of future risks. Financial firms experienced sub-
stantial devaluation in asset prices caused by increasing default rates. Firms
failed in large numbers because the loss in value made it difficult for them to
meet the financial demands of their creditors. See Id. at 2. Additionally,
banks sold mortgages-backed securities to distribute credit risk to investors
and to replenish their funds, enabling them to make more loans and dis-
tribute more debt. Due to this increased practice of mortgage securitization,
the failure of one firm often triggered the failure of another, creating a dom-
ino effect that ultimately lead to the collapse of the entire financial market.
See generally AMIYATOSH K. PURNANANDAM, ORIGINATE-TO-DISTRIBUTE
MODEL AND THE SUB-PRIME MORTGAGE CRISIS (2010), available at http://
www.bus.wisc.edu/finance/workshops/documents/subprime-latestversion.pdf.
19 See Timothy F. Geithner, Remarks at the Economic Club of New York:
Reducing Systemic Risk in a Dynamic Financial System (Jun. 9, 2008), availa-
ble at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2008/tfgO80609.html.
20 Ben S. Bernanke, Remarks at the Morehouse College: Four Questions
about the Financial Crisis (Apr. 14, 2009), available at http://www.federal
reserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke200904l4a.htm.
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ment does not attempt to reconcile such disagreements; it
merely attempts to outline some of the more salient factors that
led the country to the state it is in today - namely, the historic
trend of an increase in consumer debt, and the increase in avail-
ability of cheap credit.
A. Increase in Consumer Debt
In the 1960's, a consumer could only obtain two types of low
interest loans: a long-term, conventional mortgage, or an install-
ment loan issued only after the borrower's income and assets
were assessed in detail to prove creditworthiness. 21 The bor-
rower was required to have a face-to-face meeting with the
lender and was required to document assets that could be
pledged as collateral. 22 Beginning in the mid-1970's, the U.S. be-
gan to deregulate the consumer credit market in the form of
relaxed regulatory controls, resulting in the lifting of interest
rate ceilings and the extension of credit to high-risk borrowers. 23
Recently, up until the foreclosure-induced credit crunch, any-
one, and anything,24 could reasonably expect to receive a credit
card offer.
Compounding the issue of relaxed regulatory controls, the
United States and other industrial countries have received large
amounts of foreign saving in the past ten to fifteen years.25
Much of this foreign saving came from fast-growing emerging
markets in rapidly developing Asian nations, where consump-
tion has lagged behind rising incomes, as well as from oil-export-
21 A. Mechele Dickerson, Over-Indebtedness, the Subprime Mortgage Crisis,
and the Effect on U.S. Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 395, 397 (2009).
22 Id.
23 Id. at 398.
24 See Id. at 398 n. 12 (citing Credit Cards at 50: The Problems of Ubiquity,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2000, at Cl (noting that former Chair of the U.S. Fed-
eral Reserve Alan Greenspan once commented that "[c]hildren, dogs, cats
and moose are getting credit cards")).
25 Four Questions, supra note 20.
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ing nations that could not profitably invest all their revenue at
home and thus looked abroad for investment opportunities. 26
Fueled by the flood of credit, U.S. household debt grew at a
faster pace than income, and the level of overall household debt
became virtually equal to GDP in 2007.27 The annual net inflow
of foreign savings to the United States grew from 1.5% of GNP
in 1995 to 6% in 2006,28 as the national debt more than
doubled.29
Relaxed regulation and the increased inflow of foreign sav-
ings vastly increased the availability of consumer credit. The ac-
cessibility of technology 30 dramatic changes in the U.S. labor
market,31 and changing social norms32 about lending have also
26 Id.
27 See Laura Conaway, Household Debt v. GDP, NPR (Feb. 27, 2009, 3:45
PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2009/02/household-debtvsgdp.html.
28 Id.
29 In January of 1995, outstanding consumer debt was just over $1 trillion. In
December of 2006, that number has more than doubled to nearly $2.4 trillion.
Total outstanding consumer debt was just over $205 billion in the beginning
of 1976. Consumer Credit Outstanding, FEDERALRESERVE.GOV, http://feder
alreserve.gov/releases/g19/hist/cc hist_sa.txt (last visited Nov. 18, 2009).
30 Technology made it both easier to obtain credit and increased the demand
of credit. Mortgage and credit card applications are available and can be
approved in a matter of seconds on the internet. The explosion of the in-
ternet marketplace, e.g. eBay, Amazon.com, and a host of retailers made it
more convenient to shop and requires consumers to have a credit card in
order to shop online. See Over-Indebtedness, supra note 21, at 405-6.
31 Increased risk of temporary unemployment due global outsourcing and
corporate restructuring, compounded by inadequate healthcare and sudden
medical expenses, can be catastrophic because most Americans have no or
very little savings to rely on to pay their expenses. Additionally, income has
not kept pace with inflation, and when combined with minimum savings and
stagnant wages, U.S. workers find it necessary to rely on consumer debt to
get by. See Id. at 406-7.
32 America once had a culture of thrift, but economic, cultural, and moral
norms changed overtime. Consistent rise in housing prices impressed upon
consumers that they could take on more debt, consumers of all income scales
expected to own designer goods, and schools and other institutions no longer
talk the language of sin and temptation of excess. See David Brooks, The
Culture of Debt, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2008), available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2008/07/22/opinion/22brooks.html.
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contributed to the increase in both supply and demand of
credit. 33 What manifested, however, was only an illusion of
wealth. In hindsight, what followed next was hardly surprising,
as the foreclosure crisis ultimately resulted from long overdue
realizations of an overextended credit market and overinflated
home prices.
B. Subprime Debt Defaults
The immediate catalyst of the foreclosure crisis was more ap-
parent. Artificially low interest rates34 following the tech bubble
burst and 9/11, combined with excess capital, created the perfect
environment for irresponsible lending and speculative borrow-
ing.35 Pundits have criticized former Federal Chairman Alan
Greenspan's easy-money policies in retrospect, claiming that the
low cost of finance had much wider ramifications than the more
obvious problems of inflation. 36 The subprime debt defaults are
most commonly attributed to subprime37 mortgages, or mort-
gages offered to less credit-worthy borrowers at higher interest
rates. This practice 38 of high-risk lending and borrowing in-
creased steadily over the years, from less than 5% of total mort-
33 See Over-Indebtedness, supra note 21, at 407-9.
34 FFO dropped from 6.51 in 11/2000 to 1.73 by 01/2002, and remained in the
1 range until late 2004. See Monthly Federal Funds, FEDERALRESERVE.GOV,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data/Monthly/H15_FF O.txt
35 Cf. Paul Krugman, Revenge of the Glut. N.Y. TIMEs (Mar. 1, 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/02/opinion/02krugman.html.
36 See Max Keiser, Artificially Low Interest Rates, Pre- and Post-9/11, THE
HUFFINGTON POST (July 8, 2008), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/max-keiser/
artificially-low-interest b 11 1343.html.
37 In the United States, subprime loans are usually classified as those where
a borrower has a Fair Isaac and Company (FICO) credit score of below 620.
See Governor Edward M. Gramlich, Remarks at the Financial Services
Roundtable Annual Housing Policy Meeting (May 21, 2004), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Boarddocs/Speeches/2004/20040521/default.
htm.
38 Lenders offered more and more loans to higher-risk borrowers, including
illegal immigrants. See Sue Kirchoff & Judy Kreen, Minorities hit hard by
rising costs of subprime loans, USA TODAY (Apr. 25, 2007), available at
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gages in 199439 to 20% in 2006.4o Cheap money had also created
many opportunities for speculators, who drove the already in-
flated housing market even higher. 41 A record level of approxi-
mately 40% of homes purchased in 2005 were not intended as
primary residences. 42
Beginning in early 2007, mortgage lenders began to fail in
large numbers.43 Over 70 mortgage companies went into bank-
ruptcy in the first quarter, including large lenders such as Amer-
ican Century, American Home Mortgage, and First American
Mortgage.44 Many large financial providers exited the subprime
business, namely H&R Block, Lehman Brothers and Country-
wide.45 Beginning in the spring of 2007, various hedge funds, due
to collateralized debt packages based on subprime loans, began
to go out of business. 46 The half billion dollar losses at UBS'
hedge fund Dillon Read and the $2 billion loss at two Bearn
Stearns funds threatened the very existence of large financial in-
http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2007-04-25-subprime-min
orities-usatN.htm.
39 Jay MacDonald, Watch out for bad-loan signals, BANKRATE.COM (June
15, 2004), http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/mortgages/20040615a2.asp.
40 Ben S. Bernanke, Remarks at the National Community Reinvestment Co-
alition Annual Meeting: Fostering Sustainable Homeownership (Mar. 14,
2008), available at http://www.federaireserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernank
e20080314a.htm.
41 See generally John Cassidy, The Minsky Moment, THE NEW YORKER
(Feb. 4, 2008), available at http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2008/02/
04/080204taco talk cassidy.
42 12% of home sales in 2005 were vacation-homes, while 28% were for in-
vestment purposes. See Amy Hoak, Second-home snapshot, MARKET
WATCH (Apr. 30, 2007), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/vacation-home-
sales-set-record-in-2006-investment-deals-tumble.
43 Over 70 mortgage companies went into bankruptcy or out of business in
the first quarter of 2007, either because they held relatively large asset posi-
tions in subprime mortgages and were losing value, or because of the decline
in the lending business. See Tatom, supra note 16, at 10.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
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stitutions. 47 The domino effect ensued, and the subprime de-
faults transformed into a full blown financial crisis. By the
middle of 2008, the crisis spread to Europe, and central banks
around the globe began to cut rates in a coordinated effort to
resuscitate the world economy.48
In 1977, U.S. residential (homes and multi-family) mortgage
debt totaled just over $741 billion; by 2007, that figure grew to a
staggering $11.954 trillion. 49 The initial problem was confined to
subprime mortgages, but increasing defaults from adjustable
rate mortgages, compounded by defaults in traditional mort-
gages due to the severe devaluation of home prices and the
securitization of these mortgages, continues to fan the flames.
What began as a real-estate bust soon turned into a full blown
financial crisis, which spread across entire market sectors, and
continues to have devastating effects across the entire U.S.
economy as well as global markets. This paper focuses on the
effects on tenants, a group of individuals who, until recently, has
been overlooked and neglected in the foreclosure crisis.
II. TENANTS AT FORECLOSURE
Much attention has been given to the victims of the foreclo-
sure crisis, with the most apparent victims being ordinary home-
owners who have been signed into a subprime loan, or
traditional borrowers who can no longer afford their homes due
to the economic impact 5° and job loss. 51 Another class of victims
47 Id.
48 See Central Banks Cut Interest Rates, BBC NEWS (Oct. 8, 2008), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7658958.stm.
49 Mortgage Debt Outstanding by Type of Property and Holder. U.S. Census
Bureau, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2011/tables/11s1191.xls
(last visited Mar. 18, 2011).
50 At the end of 2009, one in four U.S. homeowners owe more on their mort-
gages than the properties are worth. This negative equity lowers homeown-
ers' mobility because they can't sell even if they want to move to find a new
job. Borrowers who owe more than 120% of their home's value are also
more likely to default. Simon & James R. Hagerty, One in Four Borrowers Is
Volume -+, Number 2
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has been overlooked until recently: renters. According to the
National Low Income Housing Coalition ("NLIHC"), more
than 20% of all properties facing foreclosure nationwide are
rental units.52 Because rental properties often house multiple
families, the NLIHC calculated that renters make up approxi-
mately 40% of the families facing eviction. 53 This percentage
may be higher in concentrated urban areas, with very low in-
come families and minority communities bearing the brunt of
rental foreclosures. 54
While fault can certainly be attributed to lenders, borrowers,
and policymakers, most renters have had no direct involvement
in the financing decisions related to their residences, but are left
to deal with the fallout nonetheless. The most immediate
problems plaguing tenants at foreclosure include inadequate no-
tice, deplorable conditions of the properties due to the land-
lord's failure to maintain, and the inability to find alternative
housing.55
Tenants in foreclosed properties are often caught unaware of
any underlying foreclosure proceedings; often "the first thing
they know is there's some people standing out in the front yard
auctioning off the property ... [a]nd the next day they've got a
Underwater, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 24, 2009), available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB 125903489722661849.html.
51 Unemployment peaked at 10.1% in October, 2009 and stands at 9.4% as
of December, 2010. Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Sur-
vey, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/Survey
OutputServlet?datatool=latestnumbers&seriesid-LNS14000000 (last vis-
ited Mar. 3, 2011).
52 NATIONAL Low INCOME HOUSING COALITION, RENTERS IN FORECLO-
SURE: DEFINING THE PROBLEM, IDENTIFYING SOLUTIONS (2008), available at
https://www2398.ssldomain.com/nlihc/doc/renters-in-foreclosure.pdf.
53 Id.
54 Id. See also KRISTOPHER S. GERARDI & PAUL S. WILLEN, FEDERAL RE-
SERVE BANK OF BOSTON, SUBPRIME MORTGAGES, FORECLOSURES, AND UR-
BAN NEIGHBORHOODS (2008), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-r
cbg/Events/Papers/Willen, %20Subprime %2OMortgages.pdf.
55 See RENTERS IN FORECLOSURE, supra note 52.
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five-day notice to vacate." 56 Tenants have no legal recourse in
the matter because generally their leases are subordinate to the
mortgage and will automatically terminate unless the mortgagee
opts to preserve them.57 Rental properties that enter foreclosure
are ill-maintained, with landlords often abandoning properties
with unpaid utility bills, and leaving the premises in general dis-
repair with deplorable conditions.58 Furthermore, evicted te-
nants often lack the necessary financial resources to relocate,
with lower income renters often unable to find suitable hous-
ing.59 To alleviate these problems, the Protecting Tenants at
Foreclosure Act of 2009 was enacted in May, 2009.
A. Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009
Effective May 20, 2009, President Obama signed the PTFA,
creating significant changes in landlord-tenant law throughout
the country. New owners of rental property acquired through
foreclosure are now finding themselves in the unfamiliar and
often unwelcome role as landlords.
The primary provision of the Act, § 702, is very broad, and
applies to all "federally-related mortgage loan[s]," as well as
56 Kelly Noble, "Something Wicked This Way Comes": Revising Rhode Is-
land Law to Require Notice to Tenants in Foreclosure, 14 ROGER WILLIAMS
U. L. REV. 328, 329 (2009).
57 It is standard practice to include a subordination clause in nearly every
lease. See 4 Stuart M. Saft, Real Estate Transactions - Commercial, § 19.2.10
(3d Ed. 2010).
58 See generally Lynn Arditi, Foreclosures Leave Some Tenants High and
Dry, THE PROVIDENCE JOURNAL (June 19, 2008), http://www.projo.com/
news/content/WATERSHUTOFFS19_06-19-08_TKAIIE3_v201.86da00.
html; Vinnie Rotondaro, Foreclosure Fears Lead To Tenants' Conundrum,
CITY LIMITS (Nov. 23, 2009), http://www.citylimits.org/content/articles/city
conversationsview.cfm?article id=3839; Jane Lerner, Tenants Suffer as more
Landlords Default, LoHUD.COM (Jan. 17, 2010), http://m.thejournalnews.
comldetail.jsp?key=322976&full= 1.
59 William Heisel & Amy Rubenstein, Foreclosures Ensnare Low-Income
Renters, MILAN PROPERTIES BLOG (Sep. 3, 2008), http://www.milanproper
ties.us/?p=104.
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"any dwelling or residential real property." 60 Under the PTFA, a
landlord-tenant relationship is created by the "subject to" lan-
guage of the provision, without regard to whether the purchaser
is actually aware of the lease or intends to become a landlord. 61
The purchaser, in effect, assumes the responsibilities of the pre-
vious owner, the terms of the lease continue to apply in full, and
the statutory obligations imposed by state landlord-tenant laws
will apply with equal force, even if the purchaser is a bank or a
real estate investor. The purchaser can prematurely terminate
the lease only if the purchaser will occupy the unit as a primary
residence, but the purchaser is required to give the tenant 90
days notice before terminating the lease.62 The minimum 90
days notice also applies to week-to-week or month-to-month
leases, even when there is no written lease.63 Additionally,
under § 703, tenants receiving Section 8 housing choice voucher
assistance also have the right to remain, and the new owner is
required to take over the housing assistance payment contract.64
The time of entry requirement of any rental agreements,
under § 702(a)(2)(A), has also recently become very lenient.
The language of the original statute read that only rental agree-
ments entered into prior to the "notice of foreclosure" would be
honored. "Notice of foreclosure," under the Dodd-Frank Re-
form Bill,65 was clarified to be "the date on which complete title
60 PTFA § 702.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 PTFA § 703. Generally, Section 8 tenants have greater protections and
have not been impacted as severely as non-Section 8 tenants. This is due to
established precedent-holding that heightened Section 8 notice and termi-
nation requirements (requiring "good cause" to evict) preempt state common
law rules extinguishing tenancies in foreclosures. See, e.g, German v. Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corp., 899 F. Supp. 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). See also
California Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
65 Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act: Guidance on Notification Responsi-
bilities Under the Act With Respect to Occupied Conveyance, 75 Fed. Reg.
66,385 (Oct. 28, 2010), available at http://www.federalregister.gov/articles/
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to a property is transferred to a successor entity or person as a
result of an order of a court or pursuant to provisions in a mort-
gage, deed of trust, or security deed."66 This means that any
leases entered into from the time of the lis pendens67 to the time
of the transfer of title may also be valid. One could imagine that
these lax requirements will likely be abused, i.e. a landlord in
foreclosure could rent out the property to a relative for an inde-
terminable number of years for a dollar.
The PTFA does have a built-in anti-fraud provision, as the
Act only applies to "bona fide" leases or tenancies. 68 This re-
quirement has three basic elements: (1) the mortgagor or his
child, spouse, or parent cannot be the tenant; (2) the tenancy
was the result of an arms-length transaction; and (3) the tenancy
requires the receipt of rent that is not substantially less than fair
market rent.69 The PTFA provides basic protections to tenants
in every state, but shall not affect the requirements of any State
or local law that provides for additional protections. The Act is
set to sunset on December 31, 2014.70
B. Constitutionality of the Act
Commentators have speculated that the PTFA may be at-
tacked under constitutional grounds. 71 The constitutionality of
2010/10/28/2010-27309/protecting-tenants-at-foreclosure-act-guidance-on-no-
tification-responsibilities-under-the-act-with.
66 Kerry Curry, Dodd-Frank Reform Bill Extends Tenant Act through 2014,
HOUSINGWIRE (Jul. 21, 2010), http://www.housingwire.com/2010/07/21/dodd-
frank-reform-bill-extends-tenact-act-through-2014.
67 A lis pendens (Latin for "suit pending") is filed by the mortgagee after
the mortgagor has defaulted on his or her mortgage. Lis Pendens, DICTION-
ARY.LAw.COM, http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected= 1172 (last
visited Jan. 18, 2011).
68 PFTA § 702(b).
69 Id.
70 PTFA § 704.
71 See Creola Johnson, Renters Evicted En Masse: Collateral Damage Arising
from the Subprime Foreclosure Crisis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 975, 1000 (2010).
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the PTFA indeed raises three particular concerns: 1) whether
the Act is a legitimate exercise of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause; 2) whether the Act impermissibly impedes
upon the rights of the states; and 3) whether the Act violates the
property rights of individuals.
1. Congressional Power
The Commerce Clause, enumerated in Article I, Section 8,
Clause 3 of the Constitution, provides that Congress shall have
the power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." 72 Con-
gressional commerce power extends to three categories of activ-
ities: channels of interstate commerce, instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, and intrastate activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce. 73 Because the regulation of fore-
closed rental properties is neither a channel nor an instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce, the test for determining whether
the activity is within Congress' power to regulate under the
Commerce Clause is whether it "substantially affects" interstate
commerce. This test is "ultimately a judicial rather than a legis-
lative question." 74 In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court
concluded that Congress cannot regulate noneconomic activities
based solely on its aggregate economic impact.75 The regulation
of foreclosed rental properties is economic in nature, however,
and according to Gonzales v. Raich, Congress needs only a "ra-
tional basis" for regulating activities of an economic nature.76
Under Gonazales, Congress has the power to regulate "purely
local activities" that have a substantial effect on interstate com-
72 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
73 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
74 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. U. S., 379 U.S. 241, 273 (1964).
75 See Lopez, 514 U.S. 536 (1995) (involving a gun control act, which the
court held to be a non-economic activity).
76 See Gonzales, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (involving an act which criminalized pos-
session of marijuana).
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merce.77 Due to the heavy securitization of mortgages by na-
tional and international banks and financial firms, the activity
regulated under the PTFA can hardly be argued to be purely
local in nature.
Even if applied to purely intrastate lenders, a constitutional
challenge would still likely be invalid. The Supreme Court has
upheld a wide variety of congressional Acts regulating intrastate
economic activity where the Court concluded that the activity
substantially affected interstate commerce. A non-exhaustive
list of these activities includes the regulation of intrastate coal
mining,78 intrastate extortionate credit transactions, 79 restau-
rants utilizing substantial interstate supplies,80 inns and hotels
catering to interstate guests,81 and production and consumption
of homegrown wheat.82 Under the current line of cases and a
rational basis review, the regulation of real property rentals
likely meets the requirement of an economic activity that sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce, and is therefore a legiti-
mate exercise of congressional power.
2. States' Rights
The Tenth Amendment of the Constitution provides that the
"powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States re-
spectively, or to the people."8 3 It has long been held that the
federal government is one of limited, enumerated powers,
whereas state powers are numerous and indefinite.8 4 In Garcia
77 Id at. 2.
78 See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S.
264 (1981).
79 See Perez v. U.S., 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
80 See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
81 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. U. S., 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
82 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
83 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
84 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584(1995).
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v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Supreme
Court held that the test for determining state immunity from
federal legislation under the Commerce Clause is whether the
regulation, as applied to the state activity, is destructive of state
sovereignty or violative of any constitutional provision.85 Here,
the PTFA is neither destructive of state sovereignty nor viola-
tive of any Constitutional provisions, and a state's rights consti-
tutional argument will most likely fail. The Court further stated
in Garcia that state sovereign interests are better protected by
procedural safeguards inherent in the federal system, because
states have considerable influence in both houses of Congress
and the Executive, and it is not the role of the Court to overstep
its bounds in the separation of power. 86 The clear boundaries of
federal power are further illustrated in New York v. United
States87 and Printz v. United States.88 As applied to the PTFA,
nothing in the language of the Act speaks directly to the state,
much less orders or compels the states to comply. The Act
merely provides rights to tenants and restricts the rights of im-
mediate successors in interest of foreclosed real properties.
3. Property Rights
The Takings Clause under the Fifth Amendment of the Con-
stitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law, "nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation. '"89
A mortgage is an interest in or lien on real estate and is thus a
right to property, protected by the Fifth Amendment of the
85 Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528
(1985).
86 Id. at 551-52.
87 See New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that the federal gov-
ernment may not order a state to enact certain legislation).
88 See Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that the federal govern-
ment may not compel state officers to administer federal programs).
89 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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Constitution.90 Arguably, forcing the immediate successor in in-
terest of a mortgage to be subject to an existing tenancy will fall
under a takings analysis. In assessing whether a taking has oc-
curred, the Supreme Court first looks to two narrow categories
deemed to be per se takings for Fifth Amendment purposes: 1)
permanent physical invasion,91 and 2) complete deprivation of
all economically beneficial uses.92 While the PTFA certainly per-
mits a physical occupation of real property, the occupation is
temporary in nature and is therefore not a permanent physical
invasion for the purposes of a Loretto taking. Additionally, the
PTFA does not deprive an owner of all economically beneficial
uses under Lucas because the owner is free to personally reside
in or to continue to rent out the property subject to an existing
lease.
Outside these two narrow categorical takings, the Court has
generally considered the factors set forth in Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. New York City.93 Primary among these factors
are the "regulation's economic impact on the claimant, the ex-
tent to which it interferes with distinct investment-backed ex-
pectations, and the character of the government action."9 4 In
considering the economic impact and the interference with the
purchaser's distinct investment-backed expectations, the Court
will consider the property as a whole. 95 For instance, if the plain-
tiff is a mortgage lender holding onto an inventory of foreclosed
90 Cf Robert M. Zinman, The Home Mortgage and Chapter 13: An Essay On
Unintended Consequences, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 133, 149 (2009).
9' Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp, 458 U.S. 419 (1982)
(permanent physical invasion, however minor, requires just compensation).
92 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (a com-
plete deprivation of all economically beneficial uses requires just compensa-
tion). See also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
93 See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
94 Lingle, 544 U.S. at 528-29.
95 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470
(1987).
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properties, the Court will consider the impact to all of the plain-
tiff's properties in aggregate. 96
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon97 remains the leading case
for the proposition that government action "may so frustrate
distinct investment-backed expectations as to amount to a 'tak-
ing."' 98 In Pennsylvania Coal, the claimant had sold the surface
rights to several properties, while expressly reserving the right
to remove the coal underneath.99 A state statute enacted after
the transaction forbade any mining of coal that could cause any
house to sink, unless the mining company owned such property
and the mining took place more than 150 feet from the property
of another. 100 The Court ruled that because the statute made it
commercially impracticable to mine the coal, it had nearly the
same effect as the complete destruction of the rights that the
claimant had reserved from the owners of the surface land.101
The PTFA, on the other hand, cannot be argued to "so frustrate
distinct investment-backed expectations as to amount to a tak-
ing." The immediate successor has the right to collect rent sub-
ject to an existing bona fide written lease or for 90 days, and the
immediate successor also keeps ownership of the property after
the lease term with no restrictions.
In a similar analysis of economic impact under Penn Central,
the claimant was prohibited from constructing a 55-story office
building above Grand Central Terminal due to a landmark pres-
ervation law. 102 The Court did not find that the regulation con-
stituted a taking because the regulation did not interfere with
the owners' present and long-time past use of the property.103
Unlike Penn Coal, where the only use of the underground rights
96 Cf Id. at 471-72.
97 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
98 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127.
99 Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414.
100 Id. at 412-13.
101 Id. at 414-15.
102 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 104.
103 Id. at 121.
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was to mine coal, in Penn Central, the terminal could still be
used as a terminal even though it could not be converted into an
office building, and the owners were still able to make reasona-
ble returns on the terminal as a terminal.104 The Court further
found that because the claimants had not petitioned to build a
smaller structure on top of the terminal, there was no way to
know if they were denied "any use of any portion" of the air-
space above the terminal. 10 5
It is difficult to place the PTFA under such a takings analysis,
because the economic impact will vary from plaintiff to plaintiff.
However, based on case law, the plaintiff will bear the heavy
burden to show an economic detriment as well as the absence of
any economic alternatives. Such a showing will be exceedingly
difficult where the Act is temporary, allows the continuation of
leases, and provides an exception for personal occupancy, espe-
cially in a slumping housing market where a profitable sale is
unlikely.
Lastly, in considering the character of the government action,
the Court looks to whether the action amounts to a physical in-
vasion or merely affects property interests through "some public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to
promote the common good."' 1 6 Here, the PTFA falls under the
latter. Furthermore, the Lingle Court overturned the "substan-
tially advances" test and held that Takings Clause challenges to
regulations had to be based on the severity of the burden that
the regulation imposed upon property rights, 0 7 not the effec-
tiveness of the regulation in furthering the governmental inter-
est. 108 Any takings challenge under current court precedent will
104 See Id.
105 Id. at 137. The issue of ripeness poses a significant burden in takings chal-
lenges. Cf. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
106 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
107 Id.
108 Id. at 548.
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likely be an arduous, uphill battle under such a deferential stan-
dard to the legislature.
C. Legislative Intent
In order to assess any success of the PTFA, as well as to facili-
tate its state and local implementation, one must first look to the
original legislative intent. The PTFA was included with the
Helping Families Save their Homes Act of 2009.109 The purpose
of the PTFA is to protect tenants, as evidenced by the title of the
Act. At a Congressional hearing on August 6, 2009 regarding
the implementation of the PTFA, Senator Dodd, along with
Senator Kerry, reasoned that the Act was intended to "assist
low and moderate-income families and to help tenants who need
protections from foreclosure or unscrupulous landlords," who
have "for too long ... been the innocent victims of the foreclo-
sure crisis."' 10 The senators wanted to ensure that "families and
mortgage holders know their rights and obligations under the
law" because of the importance of the protections."' They as-
serted that "families in these precarious circumstances should
not be forced individually to assert their rights under the law."112
Lastly, the PTFA is intended as a statutory floor, and provides
109 The Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 was intended to
prevent mortgage foreclosures and to enhance credit availability. This Act,
among other things, expands Chapter 13 bankruptcy by excluding home
mortgage debt from current maximum debt limitations, allows bankruptcy
judges to alter mortgage loans owned by individuals to reduce interest rates
or extend the repayment period, and provides a safe harbor from liability for
lenders that enter into modification agreements. See H.R. 1106, 111th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2009), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:
HRO1106:.
110 155 CONG. REC. S8978 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 2009) (statement of Sen. John
Kerry), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2009-08-06/pdf/
CREC-2009-08-06-ptl-PgS8978-2.pdf.
111 Id. (statement of Sen. Chris Dodd).
112 Id. (statement of Sen. John Kerry).
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"basic protections" for tenants in every State, "unless States
have laws or practices that provide greater protections."1 3
D. Local Implementation and Interpretation
Congress did not establish any procedures under the PTFA,
and left such determinations to the individual States. The case
study in this comment focuses on Florida, but may be illuminat-
ing to all states because Florida has consistently had one of the
highest foreclosure rates in the country. 1 4 Several questions
have been brought forth in a Florida Senate Interim report re-
garding the implementation and interpretation of the legislation:
" Is the landlord required to pursue an eviction
action after the 90 days?
" What information should be included in the 90-
day notice?
* Is the tenant still required to pay rent and to
whom?
* Does the tenant have an obligation to stay?
* Does the property manager have any ongoing
obligation to the property?
* What happens with the security deposit? 15
Some of these questions have been touched upon in meetings
with the Senate professional staff and representatives from the
real estate industry, the banking industry, the Florida Associa-
tion of Court Clerks and Comptrollers, the Florida Bar, and
113 Id. (statement of Sen. Chris Dodd).
114 Florida's foreclosure rate is currently the highest in the country, moving
up 14 percent in the 4th quarter of 2010. Florida has the nation's highest
inventory of homes in distress, accounting for nearly 1 out of every 4 foreclo-
sure properties in the entire country. Toluse Olorunnipa, Florida's foreclo-
sure rate is nation's highest, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 17, 2011), available at http:/
/www.miamiherald.com/2011/02/17/2072416/floridas-foreclosure-rate-is.html.
115 COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, INTERIM REPORT: TENANTS' RIGHTS IN
FORECLOSURE ACTIONS, S. 2010-124, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2009), available at
http://www.flsenate.gov/data/Publications/2010/Senate/reports/interim-re-
ports/pdf/2010-124ju.pdf.
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Florida Legal Services.116 The actors disagreed on how best to
proceed. For instance, representatives from Florida Legal Ser-
vices opined that there was still a need for an eviction action
subsequent to the 90 days.117 Others opined that the federal law
should act as notice of an eviction at the end of the 90 days, or
just one notice regarding the 90 days that includes a termination
date should suffice. 118
In Florida, the Housing and Consumer Umbrella Groups of
Florida Legal Services have petitioned the Supreme Court of
Florida to enact amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure in
order to conform to the PTFA,119 in response to Court solicita-
tions of comments from local practitioners. 120 Local legislation
continues into the 2011 session to codify the PTFA protections
into state legislation.121 SB 738122 creates a framework in Flor-
ida's Landlord Tenant Act 123 to incorporate the federal protec-
tions of the PTFA. However, the current proposed Florida bill is
nothing but a verbatim copy of the basic protections found in
the federal legislation, with no additional requirements or en-
forcement mechanisms. The additional protections found in the
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 These include revisions to Form 1.996 Final Judgment of Foreclosure to
include the PTFA language, as well as revisions to Rule 1.580 Writ of Posses-
sion to encompass the PTFA. See Comments of the Housing Umbrella
Group and Consumer Umbrella Group of Florida Legal Services, Inc., In re:
Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure and Forms for Use with Rules of
Civil Procedure, Case No. 09-1460 (2009), available at http://www.florida
supremecourt.org/pubinfo/summaries/briefs/09/09-1460/Filed_10-15-2009_
UmbrellaGroup.pdf.
120 See Id.
121 Alice Vickers, Dan Gelber To Be Commended, SUN SENTINEL (Nov. 18,
2009), available at http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2009-11-18/news/0911170
193_1tenants-foreclosure-proceedings-foreclosure-act.
122 S.B. 738, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla 2011), (Fla. 2011), available at http://
www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2011/0738/BillText/Filed/pdf.
123 Fla. Stat. § 83 (2009).
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2010 proposal, SB 606, which added a clause requiring the re-
turn of deposit money to the tenant, 124 was struck out.
Despite the PTFA being intended to protect "innocent victims
of the foreclosure crisis,"125 Florida courts have so far refused to
review claims of PTFA violations, holding that the PTFA does
not create a private right of action for a tenant through
§ 1983.126 Even if a court agreed to review PTFA violations, it
could run into several issues. For instance, a literal interpreta-
tion of the statute would require notice to be given by the "im-
mediate successor in interest," and a trustee in foreclosure
proceedings may not be authorized to provide the notice. The
majority of mortgages are not held by the original lender, and a
large percentage of loans have been bundled and sold as securi-
ties now owned by trusts. 127 Florida attorneys have often en-
countered foreclosures based on assignments created by entities
other than the actual note holder, and it was not unusual to find
two different plaintiffs filing a foreclosure lawsuit based on the
same mortgage. 128 This creates an issue for banks, as they act as
trustees on behalf of the actual holders of the mortgage, as well
as issues for the tenant, who may deal with multiple plaintiffs
filing eviction notices based on the same mortgage.
Another issue is the burden of proof regarding the "bona
fide" status of tenancy. The PTFA is meant to protect tenants at
foreclosure, as evidenced by the title of the Act, and as the Sen-
ators who put forth the Act pointed out, "families in these pre-
carious circumstances should not be forced individually to assert
124 S.B. 606, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010), available at http://www.fl
senate.gov/data/session/201 0/Senate/bills/billtext/pdf/s0606.pdf.
125 155 CONG. REC. S8978 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 2009) (statement of Sen. Chris
Dodd), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2009-08-06/pdf/
CREC-2009-08-06-pt 1-PgS8978-2.pdf.
126 See, e.g., Sahikh v. Fannie Mae, 2010 WL 3734851 (M. D. Fla. 2010).
127 Comments of the Housing Umbrella Group and Consumer Umbrella
Group of Florida Legal Services, Inc., supra note 119.
128 See Id.
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their rights under the law."1 29 There is an unequal bargaining at
play: the unsophisticated, powerless, innocent tenant versus the
large corporate banks, acting as trustees of many unknown
mortgage holders.130 Under such a reading, courts should place
the burden of proof upon the new landlords, or at the very least
place a very low burden of proof on the tenants in any chal-
lenges to whether the tenancy was "bona fide." Exact measures
in local legislative implementations, as well as court interpreta-
tions, will surface more in time. However, since the passing of
the federal legislation in 2009, Florida's reaction has been one of
minimum compliance, and has not been particularly tenant
friendly.
III. THE PTFA IN PRACTICE
Despite the important victory for struggling tenants nation-
wide, many have concluded that the Act is nothing but a tooth-
less wonder.131 Tenants continue to be evicted from their homes,
and the remaining properties sit idly by and decay away as
homeless rates increase. A joint study published by the NLIHC
and several other organizations reported that approximately
19% of new homelessness was a direct result of foreclosures in
129 155 CONG. REC. S8978 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 2009) (statement of Sen. John
Kerry), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2009-08-O6/pdf/
CREC-2009-08-06-ptl-PgS8978-2.pdf.
130 Public, as well as judicial sentiment has changed due to the housing crisis.
About two years ago, judges would dismiss foreclosure cases only if they
could find reason to do so. Now, after over two years of the housing crisis,
more judges are calling mortgage companies out on paperwork glitches, and
in some cases going much further in ruling favorable for homeowners. See
Amir Efrati, Foreclosure Challenges Raise Question About Judicial Role,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 24, 2009), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB
126161279914403525.html.
131 See Sasha Abramsky. Innocent Victims of the Subprime Crisis. THE
GUARDIAN (Feb. 6, 2010), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentis
free/cifamerica/2010/feb/06/housing-us-subprime-renting-tenants.
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2009.132 Most tenants do not know about the existence of the
PTFA, and banks have continued to send out illegal eviction no-
tices.133 Other tenants are often pushed into vacating the
properties early in return for low cash-for-keys agreements,
where banks provide a lump sum if the tenants agree to leave
the property immediately and a lower amount if they take a
week or two to vacate. 34 As seen, the federal government has
no real mechanisms to enforce any of the Act's provisions. This
section of the comment provides a basic overview of what typi-
cally happens to tenants after the foreclosure of an occupied
property, and pinpoints several particular deficiencies in the
Act, as well as some underlying policy concerns.
A. An Overview
In the failing real estate market, where the supply of fore-
closed properties far outnumbers the demand, banks are repos-
sessing and holding onto many rental properties. 135 Banks
typically do not wish to become landlords, because they do not
want to invest, 136 and because when they do find a buyer, issues
of rental rights could impede a sale.137 The law is still new and
132 NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS ET AL., FORECLOSURE TO
HOMELESSNESS 2009: THE FORGOTTEN VICTIMS OF THE SUBPRIME CRISIS 5
(2009), available at http://www.nationalhomeless.org/advocacy/Foreclosure
toHomelessness0609.pdf.
133 See Id.
134 See Sasha Abramsky. Hidden Victims of Eviction. THE DAILY BEAST
(Feb. 9, 2010), http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-02-09/
the-hidden-eviction-victims/?cid=HP:topnav:givingb
135 Kathryn Dobies & Erin Halasz, Renters face eviction, betrayal in landlord
foreclosure, Medill Reports-Northwestern University, http://news.medill.
northwestern.edu/chicago/govt/story.aspx?id=156898 (last visited Mar. 12,
2010).
136 Id.
137 Anna Scott, The Big Takeover, Looking at What Happens When Banks
Foreclose on Troubled Properties, LA DOWNTOWN NEWS (Jan. 22, 2010),
http://www.ladowntownnews.com/articles/2010/01/28/news/doc4b5a32eb311a
9074404345.txt.
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many tenants are unaware of their rights, and according to
Cathy Vandenberg, managing attorney at Cobb County office of
Atlanta Legal Aid, "[b]anks, who aren't keen on becoming
rental landlords, don't always volunteer the law's provisions to
the tenant." 138 Unscrupulous real estate agents pressure renters
by sending them misleading letters; one such letter sent by a
Texas law firm stated, "[t]his letter constitutes formal and final
demand that you vacate the premises within three days of the
date this letter is delivered" and threatened legal costs if the
tenant did not comply. 139
Even those renters who are aware of the law and are fortu-
nate enough to have representation remain at the mercy of
courts and a system ill-equipped to deal with their particular
challenges. For instance, a tenant is likely to lose his or her se-
curity deposit if the owner goes into foreclosure because law-
suits are costly. Even if a tenant is able to take the landlord to
small claims court, in most cases the landlord will have declared
bankruptcy, and a judgment becomes unobtainable. 140 Accord-
ing to William Deegan, executive director of the American Te-
nants Association, renters are more likely to need their security
deposits when they look for a new place to live, as "[t]enants
tend to be poor, young families, the elderly. They fall through
the cracks."41 Forced to move on short notice when landlords
fail to pay the mortgage, many renters not only lose their secur-
ity deposits, but also often see their lives turned upside down.
138 P6ralte C. Paul, Law helps renters forced out when landlord defaults, THE
ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION (Nov. 22, 2009), http://www.ajc.com/
news/law-helps-renters-forced-190397.html.
139 Les Christie, Your landlord got foreclosed. Do you have to go?, CNN
MONEY (Feb. 18, 2010), http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/18/real-estate/keep-
kicking-out tenants.
140 Martha C. White, Renters Hit by Foreclosure Crisis Too, THE WASHING-
TON INDEPENDENT (June 26, 2009), available at http://washingtonindepen
dent.com/46844/renters-hit-by-foreclosure-crisis-too.
141 Id.
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Tiquanda Newton, a tenant under Section 8 in Connecticut,
received a notice two days before Christmas of 2009 that she
and her two children had a week to move out because of a fore-
closure action.142 "I felt helpless at that time. I didn't know what
to do," she said.4 The deadline was impossible to meet in the
middle of winter in a tight Section 8 subsidized housing mar-
ket. 144 Ms. Newton was not informed of her rights under the
PTFA, and her Section 8 lease was ignored.145 In response to
numerous complaints like Ms. Newton's throughout the state,
Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal issued
cease-and-desist letters1 46 to a host of default servicing practi-
tioners ordering them to stop "abrupt and illegal evictions" of
tenants residing in foreclosed properties.147 According to Blu-
menthal, real estate agents typically begin eviction procedures
immediately following a foreclosure despite the 90-day notice
rule, or pressure the tenants to leave without informing them of
their rights.' 48
142 Mary E. O'Leary, State acts to protect renters in foreclosures, NEW HA-
VEN REGISTER (Feb. 2, 2010), available at http://www.nhregister.com/articles/
2010/02/02/news/a3-netenants.txt.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 In the letters, Blumenthal instructs servicers to "treat all occupants of
foreclosed properties as bona fide tenants, unless there is credible evidence
to the contrary," and to "refrain from treating the mere failure to responding
to a notice as evidence that the occupant is not a bona fide tenant." Oppo-
nents have argued that any borrower who chooses to hide behind their door
would be treated as "bona fide" under federal law. See Joe Weisenthal, Con-
necticut's Richard Blumenthal Has A Truly Bizarre Idea For Protecting
Homeowners, BusINEss INSIDER (Feb. 23, 2010), www.businessinsider.com/
connecticuts-richard-blumenthal-has-a-truly-bizarre-idea-for-protecting-
homeowners-2010-2.
147 Carrie Bay, AG Orders Banks, Attorneys to Stop Evictions Violating Fed-
eral Tenant Law, DS NEWS (Feb. 3, 2010), www.dsnews.com/articles/ag-or-
ders-servicers-attorneys-to-stop-evictions-violating-federal-tenant-law-2010-
02 -03.
148 Id.
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Evidently, banks have continued to violate the PTFA provi-
sions by throwing tenants out with inadequate notice or through
unlawful tactics. Fannie Mae, the U.S. Government-chartered
corporation, has tried to distinguish itself from other financial
institutions by offering support for renters. 149 Tenants Together,
a California organization for renter's rights, tells a different
story.150 According to Gabe Treves, program director at the or-
ganization, "Fannie Mae hires the same realtors as the rest of
the banks. These realtors see tenants as a roadblock to their
commission, so they bully and mislead them into taking the
'cash-for-keys' offers and signing away their rights to stay in
their homes." 151 Owen Casper, a San Diego-based tenant, re-
ceived a letter from Fannie Mae informing him of his option to
accept a cash-for-keys offer, stay up to an extra 90 days as per-
mitted by the PTFA, or to sign a new month-to-month lease.152
Mr. Casper opted to sign a new month-to-month lease, but the
real estate agent sent by Fannie Mae told him that the option
was not available to tenants with existing monthly agreements,
and his sole option was to take the cash and move out.153 Te-
nants Together reports that Mr. Casper's case is typical of te-
nants throughout several California counties.154
The bank's failure to abide by the law is hardly surprising.
Many foreclosed properties suffer from deplorable conditions,
and while tenants can sue their prior landlords under state land-
149 Renters in Fannie Mae-owned properties may be able to stay in their
homes. See Buying in a Buyer's Market, FANNIEMAE.COM, http://www.fannie
mae.com/kb/index?page=home&c=homebuyers-supportforrenters (last vis-
ited March 3, 2011).
150 Gabe Treves, Fannie Mae Violates Its Own Policy By Throwing Tenants
Out After Foreclosure, NEWSBLAZE (Feb. 3, 2010), http://newsblaze.com/
story/20100203121442zzzz.nb/topstory.html.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
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lord-tenant laws and minimum housing codes,155 the point is
moot since after foreclosure, many landlords are bankrupt and
there is no money to collect.156 Banks, under the PTFA, now
step into the shoes of the previous landlord and assume all lia-
bilities under the prior lease agreement, relevant state laws, and
local codes or ordinances. This creates an immediate cause of
action against the bank, who is not insolvent, and can pay sub-
stantial damages. 157 Banks will, of course, follow the path of
least resistance. Every tenant they can evict or pay off reduces a
great amount of exposure to additional liability. Prior to the
PTFA, banks avoided the roles of landlords because they
wanted the foreclosed property readily available for sale. 158 Now
that the roles are forced upon them, they are trying to buy out
of it as cost effectively as possible.
B. Deficiencies and Policy Concerns
A bank circumventing the PTFA in the aforementioned man-
ner is not the only deficiency of the Act. The most apparent de-
ficiency of the PTFA was the Act's limited time frame, but the
PTFA has been amended to sunset on December 31, 2014.159
155 State to state landlord tenant laws vary, but most states have adopted the
Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act of 1972, and general prohib-
ited practices for which damages can be collected include interruption of util-
ities, and failure to maintain the residences in a habitable manner. See
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT Acr (1972), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edubll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1970s/urlta72.htm.
156 See Renters Face Eviction, supra note 135.
157 For instance, in Florida, the landlord may become liable for three times
rent or actual and consequential damages, as well as attorney's fees for viola-
tions under Fla. Stat. §83.67, these include failure to: maintain the residence
in good repair, make reasonable provisions for extermination of pests, pro-
vide locks and cleans, provide for clean and safe common areas, provide gar-
bage pickup, and provide for functional facilities for heat during the winter,
running water, and hot water. See Fla Stat. § 83.67 (2009).
158 See Renters Face Eviction, supra note 135.
159 PTFA § 704.
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Taking in the amount of REO inventory, the number of option
adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) resets, 160 spillover costs, and
the court backlog in foreclosure cases, the earlier 2012 sunset
provision was simply not enough to accommodate the ongoing
crisis. Foreclosure projections have risen dramatically since an
early 2006 estimate of 1.1 million subprime foreclosures to a
January 2009 estimate of 13 million foreclosures on all types of
loans through 2014.161 The waves of ARM resets predicted to
detonate in early 2009 were delayed well into 2010 due to histor-
ically low interest rates. 162 ARMs have typically reset after five
years, at which point monthly bills increase by at least 65%.163
One third of all outstanding loans from 2005-2007 are deeply
delinquent.164 Despite this two year addition to the sunset provi-
sion, further extensions may be necessary to mitigate the long
term damage to renters across the country.
Another particular instance the PTFA does not address is the
limbo period between the time of the foreclosure filing and re-
possession by the bank, or the immediate successor in interest.
During this period, properties are not maintained, utilities are
not paid, and a tenant has no legal recourse because the land-
160 Option adjustable rate mortgages (ARM), have initial low payments, but
once it "resets" at a set future date, monthly payments increase substantially.
The ARM has often been compared to a ticking time bomb and has been
called one of the "riskiest and most complicated home loan product ever
created." See Nightmare Mortgages, BUSINESS WEEK (Sept. 11, 2006), availa-
ble at www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_37/b4000001.htm.
161 CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, SOARING SPILLOVER; ACCELERAT-
ING FORECLOSURES TO COST NEIGHBORS $502 BILLION IN 2009 ALONE; 69.5
MILLION HOMES LOSE $7,200 ON AVERAGE 1 (2009), available at http://www.
responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/soaring-spillover-
3-09.pdf.
162 See Prashant Gopal, Good News: Option ARM Resets Delayed, BUSINESS
WEEK (Apr. 16, 2009), available at www.businessweek.com/lifestyle/content/
apr2009/bw20090416_103126.htm.
163 Id.
164 Id.
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lord has abandoned the property or is insolvent.165 This is espe-
cially true in judicial foreclosure states, which make up
approximately half of the country.166 What results in Florida is
at least 180 days of purgatory for the property and its tenants. 167
This period has become increasingly longer due to the sheer
number of foreclosures in the state. In 2009, Florida tackled a
total of 398,825 foreclosure cases, 168 yet at the close of 2009, the
state had backlogged another 456,000 pending cases. 169 Special
courts have been set up, commonly referred to as "rocket dock-
ets,"170 and the Florida legislature has appropriated $9.6 million
in 2010 to hire semi-retired judges and case managers to preside
over these fast-track foreclosure hearings.171 However, recent is-
sues with falsified or incorrect lender documentation, such as
"robo signing,"1 72 may have slowed down the entire process. 173
165 Cf. Mary Jane Smetanka, If no one owns the home, who's watching the
house?, STAR TRIBUNE (Nov. 29, 2009), available at http://www.startribune.
com/local/west/77841947.html.
166 See, e.g., Diana Olick, The Next Robo-Signing Crisis?, CNBC (Jan. 25,
2011), http://www.cnbc.com/id/41250862.
167 The foreclosure timeline varies from state to state. In Florida the time-
line is typically 180 days. See Florida Foreclosure Law Summary Quick Facts,
FORECLOSURELAW.ORG, http://www.foreclosurelaw.org/FloridaForeclosure-
Law.htm (last visited, March 3, 2011).
168 Kimberly Miller, Court records show Florida foreclosures increasing;
Palm Beach County leveling off, PALM BEACH POST (Feb. 4, 2010, 6:50 PM),
http://www.palmbeachpost.com/money/real-estate/court-records-show-florida
-foreclosures-increasing-palm-beach-214312.html.
169 Annie Butterworth Jones, Court orders managed mediation for foreclo-
sures, FLORIDA BAR NEWS (Jan. 15, 2010), http://www.floridabar.org/divcom/
jn/jnnews0l.nsf/8c9f13012b96736985256aa900624829/eaaece58a65def7685257
6a20048fd6b.
170 A "rocket docket" hearing may consist of a teleconference between the
judge, lenders, and the borrowers. Lenders do not have to appear in person,
and borrowers rarely ever show up to contest the loss of their homes. See
David McLaughlin, Why Florida's Foreclosure Machine is Slowing Down,
BUSINESS WEEK (Oct. 18, 2010), available at http://www.businessweek.com/
magazine/content/10_43/b4200049069430.htm.
171 Id.
172 Robo signing refers to recent revelations that loan servicers were rapidly
signing foreclosure documents without even reading them to ensure that the
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The most important deficiency is that the PTFA lacks any real
enforcement mechanisms. Banks, their attorneys and realtors
continue to engage in unlawful practices and send illegal notices
to evict tenants to limit their liability. 174 Due to the backlog of
foreclosures and evictions in the judiciary, practices of summary
evictions have become routine and violations of the PTFA al-
most always slip through the cracks. Furthermore, court access
for tenants has generally been extremely circumscribed. Florida
Legal Services recently conducted an eviction study in Miami-
Dade County. 175 During a sixteen month period in 2008-2009,
out of a total of 27,054 residential evictions filed in Miami Dade
County, only 6,831 (25%) of tenants filed a response to the ini-
tial complaint. 176 For the 25% that filed an answer, 30% were
immediately dismissed for failure to post rent or file a Motion to
Determine Rent, as required by the court. 177 Only 554 (13.6%)
of the answers filed were not dismissed before reaching a hear-
ing, and out of these only three resulted in a judgment for the
tenant. 178 Even these three judgments included two where the
tenant was ultimately evicted. 179 The poorest five of the 80 zip
codes accounted for over 15% of all evictions - all of these zip
codes are over 90% minority.1s
In Miami-Dade, the likelihood of a tenant reaching a judge is
miniscule, much less being able to raise the PTFA as an affirma-
tive defense to an unlawful eviction. What results, according to
information was accurate. See Tami Luhby, Robo-signing: Just the Start of
Bigger Problems, CNNMONEY.COM (Oct. 22, 2010), http://money.cnn.com/
2010/10/22/realestate/foreclosure-paperwork-problems/index.htm.
173 McLaughlin, supra note 170.
174 See supra Part III.A.
175 Brief for the Community Lawyering Clinic, University of Miami Law
School as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, Kendrick v. Corser, No. 10-
488-AP, (11th Cir. 2011) (on file with author).
176 Id. at 10-17.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 16.
180 Id. at 11-12.
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Purvi Shah, a Florida Legal Services attorney, is that "the law in
general is being deliberately ignored."181 The same may ring
true across the country. Connecticut Attorney General Blumen-
thal has issued numerous cease-and-desist letters to a host of
default service practitioners, ordering them to stop abrupt and
illegal evictions: "[F]ast-track evictions not only harm tenants,
but turn vacant properties into eyesores and even crime havens,
diminishing values neighborhood wide. We are putting these
companies on notice: follow federal law, and treat tenants fairly,
or face legal action."182 California Attorney General Brown is-
sued similar letters to stop unlawful evictions.183 It is still un-
clear, however, what legal actions were taken, and whether
anyone has followed through.
Forcefully evicting tenants who pay rent creates even more
vacant properties. Empty and poorly maintained homes lead to
vandalism, theft, and blighted neighborhoods. 184 The FBI in
2008 had warned of thieves targeting copper in foreclosed
homes. 185 A realtor taking a prospective buyer to a vacant home
walked into one such situation in Wisconsin, where two people
came to the house with a lawnmower under the guise of garden-
ers, broke into the house and gutted it for its copper piping.186
Neglect, disrepair and crime naturally diminish value in neigh-
borhoods, making it even more difficult for banks to liquidate
181 Daniel Shoer Roth, Renters Bullied by Owners Facing Foreclosure, THE
MIAMi HERALD (Apr. 13, 2010), available at http:///www.miamiherald.comi/
2010/04/13/1576508/renters-bullied-by-owners-facing.html.
182 Bay, supra note 147.
183 Press Release, Office of the Attorney General, State of California De-
partment of Justice, Brown Investigates Whether Tenants' Rights Are Vio-
lated in Foreclosures (Jun. 28, 2010), available at http://oag.ca.gov/news/
pressrelease?id=1941.
184 See generally Creola Johnson, Fight Blight: Cities Sue to Hold Lenders
Responsible for the Rise in Foreclosures and Abandoned Properties, 2008
UTAH L. REV. 1169 (2008).
185 Foreclosed Homes Targeted For Copper: Realtor Walks In On Brazen
Burglars, Police Say, WISN.coM (Sep. 15, 2009 6:26 PM), http://www.wisn.
com/money/20932348/detail.html.
186 See Id.
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their ever-increasing foreclosure inventory. Since evicting sound
tenants contributes to further abandonment and disrepair,
banks, in a way, have been indirectly perpetuating the condi-
tions of the declining housing market.
To elaborate further on the stagnant condition of today's
housing market, it is important to note that foreclosures cause a
"spillover" effect by depressing the value of nearby homes. In
2009, almost half of all home sales were either foreclosures or
short sales 187, i.e. properties sold at a substantial discount. 188 The
result has been "lower property values for homeowners and a
reduced tax base for communities."189 Many homeowners today
are paying mortgages that cost more than the current market
value of their homes, thus resulting in more short sales. The
Center for Responsible Lending estimates that, in 2009 alone,
foreclosures would cause 69.5 million nearby homes to suffer
price declines averaging $7,200 per home, resulting in a $502 bil-
lion total decline in property values. 190 These projections only
account for value decline caused by nearby foreclosures, and do
not account for the overall slowdown in the housing market or
for the general disrepair and increase in crime in particular de-
clining neighborhoods.1 91
Due to the substantial decline in housing prices, banks have
been holding onto empty homes and rental properties. Accord-
ing to RealtyTrac, a national online marketer of foreclosed
properties, only approximately one third of foreclosed proper-
187 A short sale is an agreement between the mortgagee and mortgagor to
sell the property for less than the unpaid mortgage, through this, delinquent
homeowners escape a mortgage they cannot afford, and lenders, although
taking a loss, avoid the costlier process of completing a foreclosure. See gen-
erally Stephanie Armour, Home Sellers Frustrated as Short-sale Deals Col-
lapse, USA TODAY (Aug. 5, 2009), available at http://www.usatoday.com/
money/economy/housing/2009-08-04-short-sales-mortgagesN.htm.
188 SOARING SPILLOVER, supra note 161, at 1.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
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ties were being listed on the market in 2009.192 Banks are likely
afraid to drive home prices down even further, since the supply
of foreclosed properties far outnumber the demand. 93 How-
ever, the reality of it all is puzzling; vacant properties sit idly by
and decay as homeless rates increase. 194 Neighborhoods fall to
shambles and property values continue to deflate as crime and
unemployment rises. Banks, financial institutions, and mort-
gage holders must learn to take these factors into account and
reevaluate their strategies and practices. They must realize that
long term sustainability, social stability and the recovery of
neighborhoods, and ultimately the housing market, is more im-
portant than any immediate short term gains or the limitation
on foreseeable liabilities.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009 marks an
important first step in addressing a long overlooked problem;
however, it is deficient in several respects. To ensure that te-
nants at foreclosure are able to remain in their homes, commu-
nity organizers must educate tenants of their rights, laws must
be enacted to ensure that tenants' utilities are not shut off when
their landlords go into foreclosure, and courts should allow te-
nants to collect statutory damages against real estate profession-
als that violate the PTFA. Additionally, states should consider
enacting programs such as those that have been successful in
California and Massachusetts.
192 Les Christie, Flood of Foreclosures: It's Worse than you Think,
CNNMoNEY.COM (Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.money.cnn.com/2009/01/21/
real estate/ghost inventory/index.htm?postversion=2009012314.
193 Cf. Id. (asserting that excess inventory is one of the biggest problems in
housing these days and leads to lower housing prices, which leads to more
foreclosures).
194 See S.B. 606, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010), available at http://www.
flsenate.gov/data/session/2010 /Senate/bills/billtext/pdf/sO606.pdf.
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A. Community Organizing and Outreach
The most important deficiency of the law is perhaps the lack
of knowledge, which renders the federal law ineffective. On a
practical level, knowledge of the law is required before tenants
can even attempt to assert their rights. Community organiza-
tions and tenants' rights groups have been and should continue
to educate renters regarding the law.195 However, there is no
end in sight to home foreclosures over the next few years and it
is unclear whether outreach efforts can keep up. According to
University of Minnesota Law Professor Ann Burkhart, who
helped write the new foreclosure laws, it is also unclear whether
any amount of outreach will force landlords to follow the law.196
According to Professor Burkhart, there is "an inherent imbal-
ance in power between landlords and tenants that it's [sic] al-
ways been a problem forcing landlords to comply with these
kinds of laws ... [t]he average tenant doesn't know their rights
and doesn't have the time or money to pursue a suit. .. 197
One outreach group, however, has achieved tremendous suc-
cess. Project "No One Leaves," organized by the Harvard Legal
Aid Bureau (HLAB), is a student run, door-to-door canvassing
project that provides awareness and legal services to tenants and
former owners at foreclosure. 198 The Project, in 2009 alone, con-
tacted over 1,000 people living in foreclosed properties, and was
195 See, e.g., Protecting Renters and Stabilizing the Rental Supply, STABLE-
COMMUNITIES.ORG, http://www.stablecommunities.org/stabilization-planning
/develop-strategies/protecting-renters-and-stabilizing-the-rental-supply (last
visited Mar. 12, 2010); The Rights of Tenants During Foreclosure, NEW
JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE, http://www.state.nj.us/
publicadvocate/public/issues/tenants-during-foreclosure.html#3 (last visited
Mar. 12, 2010).
196 Jessica Mador, Are the Laws Protecting Tenants in Foreclosure Working?
MINNESOTA PUBLIC RADIO (Dec. 17, 2008), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/
display/web/2008/12/12/renters.
197 Id.
198 See PROJEcT No ONE LEAVES, http://www.projectnooneleaves.org (last
visited Jan. 18, 2011).
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able to provide limited or full representation in each of those
resident's eventual eviction cases. 199 "No One Leaves" utilizes
pro-bono attorneys, volunteers from surrounding universities,
community organizers, as well as tenants, to canvass foreclosed
neighborhoods, organize pro-se workshops, and provide repre-
sentation to keep people in their homes.200 The Project also
works with a community bank,201 Boston Community Capital
(BCC), to purchase foreclosed homes, often at below-market
cost,202 and mortgage those homes back to the foreclosing
homeowners at the current market rate.20 3 Where the Project
succeeded most, however, is in its partnership with City Life
Vida Urbana,204 a grassroots organization responsible for build-
ing community power and ultimately effecting legislative
change.205 In August of 2010, Massachusetts passed the "most
comprehensive law in the country for protecting people living in
199 Elaine McArdle, Staunching the Foreclosure Crisis, HARVARD LAW BUL-
LETIN (Winter 2010), http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/bulletin/201O/winter/
outside.php.
200 See Id. See also PROJECT No ONE LEAVES, supra note 198.
201 Community banks are "mission driven" instead of "profit driven." See
e.g., About Us, SUNRISEBANKS.COM, http://www.sunrisebanks.com/about-us.
asp (last visited Jan. 18, 2011).
202 Sometimes, when the bank is unwilling to cut a deal, BCC will purchase
the mortgage at pre-recession cost. Jeremy C. Fox, Facing eviction, foreclosed
homeowners raise voices, THE BosToN GLOBE (Dec. 20, 2010 11:26 AM),
http://www.boston.com/yourtown/news/downtown/2010/12/foreclosedhome
owners-protest.html.
203 See Foreclosure Relief, BOSTON COMMUNITY CAPITAL.ORG, http://www.
bostoncommunitycapital.org/what/foreclosure-relief (last visited Jan. 20,
2011).
204 City Life Vida Urbana is the glue that holds the entire project together.
"City Life... is a grassroots community organization in Boston committed to
fighting for racial, social, and economic justice ... by building working class
power through direct action, coalition building, education and advocacy."
City Life Vida Urbana - Mission Statement, http://www.clvu.org (last visited
Jan. 20, 2011).
205 See Boston Group Helps Homeowners 'Stand Up, Fight Back' Against
Foreclosure (PBS NewsHour television broadcast Oct. 19, 2010), available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/ uly-dec IO/foreclosures 10-1 9.html.
Volume +, Number 2
DePaul Journal f~or Social Jus5tice 252
Spring 2011
38
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol4/iss2/2
255 TENANTS AT rORECLOSURE
foreclosed-on properties." 206A similar initiative, a sister project
of HLAB's Project "No One Leaves," has launched successfully
in Miami, organized by students from the University of Miami
under the guidance of the Community Justice Project at Florida
Legal Services. 207 The project has, with the help of student vol-
unteers, reached out to over 1,000 households in the second half
of 2010, and has educated tenants at foreclosure through know-
your-rights presentations and pro-se workshops.208 This year, the
Miami project plans to expand institutionally, recruit more vol-
unteers, provide more direct services to low-income tenants in
danger of being unlawfully evicted, and to help in national
movement building. Various outreach initiatives by law school
clinics and community organizations have also recently sprouted
up in New York,20 9 Chicago 210 , Palo Alto,211 and many other cit-
ies across the country.
B. Access to Utilities
The purpose of the PTFA is to keep tenants at foreclosure in
their homes, but one glaring oversight is that utilities may be-
206 Massachusetts enacts landmark foreclosure protections drafted by Harvard
Law School students, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL - NEWS AND EVENTS (Aug.
10, 2010), http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2010/08/lO foreclosure.law.html
207 See PROJECT No ONE LEAVES MIAMI, http://www.nooneleavesmiami.org
(last visited Jan. 18, 2011).
208 See Old Routes, PROJECT No ONE LEAVES MIAMI, http://sites.google.
com/site/nooneleavesmiami/canvassing-zones-1/old-routes (last visited Mar.
16, 2011) (indicating the number of households reached out to on each of six
separate canvassing outings).
209 See Carol Demare, Clinic for tenants in foreclosures opens, TIMES UNION
(Nov. 3, 2010), available at http://web.timesunion.com/AspStories/story.asp?
category=REGION&storyID=986288&B CCode=&newsdate= 11/3/2010.
210 See CHICAGO ANTI-EVICTION CAMPAIGN, http://chicagoantieviction.org/
(last visited Feb. 26, 2011).
211 See i.e., COMMUNITY LEGAL SERVICES IN EAST PALO ALTO TENANT
OUTREACH PROPOSAL (Feb. 10, 2010), available at http://www.ci.east-palo-
alto.ca.us/uploads/4189/021610 % 20 % 20CC % 20Item % 2030 % 20 % 20Attach
ment % 20for %2OComm %2OLegal % 2OServ % 20Contract % 20% 2ORequest.
pdf.
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come inaccessible during the foreclosure process. Without run-
ning water, electricity, or garbage pickup, tenants are unlikely to
stay in foreclosed rentals for long, despite having a legal right to
do so. In these cases, the landlord will often be insolvent or have
gone missing, and claims for constructive eviction will serve no
function. In South Florida, most tenant buildings are on a single
meter, and the Miami-Dade Water and Sewage Department
does not allow tenants to take over the landlord's delinquent
bill.212 Current proposals are in negotiations with Miami-Dade
Water and Sewage, but have been met with much resistance.
In contrast, Minnesota, in May of 2010, signed into law a
"Tenant Bill of Rights," which requires utility companies to pro-
vide the following to single-metered residential buildings when
landlords fail to pay the bills: (1) adequate notice of termination
to tenants in buildings whose landlords failed to pay; and (2) an
allowance for tenants to have the service continued or recon-
nected by paying only current charges for the most recent billing
period.213
C. Statutory Damages and Loss Mitigation
Due to the absence of federal enforcement mechanisms, the
unwillingness of federal courts to review PTFA violations, and
the continued violation of the federal law by real estate practi-
tioners, states should create statutory damages for violations of
the law. 214 Although states have begun to adopt the federal leg-
islation into state law, 215 the legislation offers no immediate re-
lief to current tenants already displaced or in danger of
displacement due to the delay in the legislative process, the gap
212 See Tariq Osborne, Absentee landlords abandon Opa-locka renters, THE
MIAMI TIMES, Aug. 5-11, 2009, at 8A.
213 Minn. Stat. §504B.215(3) (2010), available at https://www.revisor.mn.gov/
statutes/?id=504B.215.
214 See supra Part II.B.
215 See S.B. 606, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010), available at http://www.
flsenate.gov/data/session/2010/Senate/bills/billtext/pdf/sO606.pdf.
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between legislation and administration, and the unclear enforce-
ment mechanisms that may vary from state to state. In states
such as Florida, where the proposed state legislation is one of
minimal compliance - a virtual copycat of the federal law - vio-
lations will undoubtedly continue even after the state enact-
ment. One thing that could help, says Professor Burkhart, is for
the language of the law to be strengthened to mandate penalties,
such as statutory damages and attorney's fees, for landlords who
break the law.216 In August of 2010, Massachusetts signed legis-
lation giving tenants the right to sue and collect a minimum of
$5,000 damages against banks that evict in violation of the
law.2
17
Statutory damages will force banks to take their roles of land-
lords more seriously and will push them to reevaluate the costs
associated with vacant properties. Additionally, states should
consider creating incentives for banks that voluntarily choose to
lease out their foreclosure inventories, in the form of subsidies
or tax benefits. In today's housing crisis, unlike the 1980's condo
crisis, a speedy resale is not possible due to the sheer amount of
foreclosure inventory.218 Banks, therefore, have a greater incen-
tive to rent out properties and if not to follow the federal law,
then at least to mitigate foreclosure losses. Early in 2009, Fannie
Mae announced a program where it leased back the home to
owners who lost their homes to foreclosure. 219 A Fannie spokes-
person said the program was created to "recover losses incurred
when Fannie Mae takes over the remaining loan on foreclosed
rental properties." 220 Fannie sometimes has to sell these proper-
216 Mador, supra note 196.
217 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 6 (2010), availale at http://www.malegisla
ture.gov/Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/2010/Chapter258.
218 Cf. Andree Brooks, Talking: Foreclosure; Protecting Tenants' Interests,
N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 22, 1991), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/09/22/
realestate/talking-foreclosure-protecting-tenants-interests.html.
219 See Alenjandro Lazo, Fannie Mae to allow borrowers in foreclosure to
lease back homes, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2009), available at http://articles.la
times.com/2009/nov/06/business/fi-fannie 6.
220 Golobay, supra note 12.
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ties at steep discounts in the current market, and a renter helps
Fannie to recoup the difference in the meantime.221 Fannie's pol-
icy may only be a temporary solution, but it keeps people in
housing and mitigates lender losses. 222
Despite the incentives offered to banks, the trend of banks
becoming landlords has been slow to catch on, because banks
don't want to invest, they are worried about a lease potentially
impeding a resale, and because they are ill-equipped to handle
the requirements of being a landlord.223 Various programs have,
however, sprouted up in the past year to fill this managerial role.
FirstService Corporation, for instance, has announced the provi-
sion of management services aimed at encouraging renting out
bank-owned properties as opposed to leaving them vacant to di-
lapidate and depreciate.224 Through its subsidiary, TenantAc-
cess, the company seeks to combine "property management and
field asset preservation to reach out to servicers and whole loan
holders of foreclosed properties and offer to manage a rental or
program that would run while the property is being sold."225 The
company now boasts more than 350 property managers nation-
wide and has been specifically targeting "instant landlords"
under the PTFA.226
The National Residential Property Receivership Program
similarly "connects lenders, servicers, and investors with inde-
pendent property managers to handle tenant related issues on
foreclosed properties." 227 Courts have, in some cases, appointed
receivers to handle the property management for a lender who
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Dobies, supra note 135.
224 Golobay, supra note 12.
225 Id.
226 TenantAccess Delivers Tenant Protection Response Program, TENANTAC-
CESS.COM, http://www.tenantaccess.com/tenantaccess-delivers-tenant-protec
tion-response-program.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2010).
227 Austin Kilgore, Program Connects Property Managers with Mortgagors,
HOUSINGWIRE (Nov. 9, 2009), http://www.housingwire.com/2009/11/09/
programs-connects-property-managers-with-mortgagors.
Volume , Number 2 Spring 2011
42
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol4/iss2/2
forecloses on a borrower.228 The program provides property
managers who specialize in tenant housing and lawyers who can
work on behalf of the lenders.229 Mortgage Contracting Services
(MCS) has recently launched a 24-hour call center, specializing
in emergency response for tenant-occupied properties. 230 MCS
provides new bank-landlords with "emergency coverage for ten-
ant-occupied properties [which] enables them to fulfill that role,
all without bearing the cost of hiring and training additional
vendors." 231 With codified federal or state penalties for breaches
of the law, banks will have to reweigh their opportunity costs
and may well take advantage of these new contracting services.
However, both states and Congress should watch these con-
tracting services closely to assess whether additional regulation
might be required.
D. Other Recommendations
Several notable programs have been created throughout the
country to combat issues of vacant properties that could be
adopted by state or local governments. One of these programs is
the Residential Abandoned Property Program.232 The city of
Chula Vista, California won a statewide award for its code en-
forcement program aimed at alleviating issues associated with
abandoned homes, such as vandalism, crime, and deprecia-
tion.233 The program was launched over two years ago, and it
requires mortgage lenders to maintain vacant foreclosed homes
to neighborhood standards, i.e. keeping the lawns green, the
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 See Brittany Dunn, Mortgage Contracting Services Launches 24-Hour
Call Center, DSNEws (Feb. 15, 2010), http://www.dsnews.com/articles/mort
gage-contracting-services-launches-24-hour-call-center-2010-02-15.
231 Id.
232 See Tanya Sierra, Keeping foreclosed homes from blight, SIGN ON SAN
DIEGO NEWS (Oct. 3, 2009, 2:00 AM), http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/
2009/oct/03/citys-code-enforcers-win -statewide-award-program.
233 Id.
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fences and doors locked, and repairing broken windows.234 The
program was a preventative measure seeking to avert neighbor-
hoods from becoming blighted due to poor maintenance, and it
required lenders to register the home with the city.235 Nearly
9,000 foreclosures occurred in the past two years, and more than
2,600 properties had been registered with the city, producing
more than $183,000 in registration fees.236 Additionally 2,000
complaints were filed and $1.3 million in fines were issued.237
The National Community Stabilization Trust Program is an-
other effort that seeks to link local governments and banks
holding foreclosed homes. 238 Under the program, participating
banks will allow local officials first priority in viewing and buy-
ing properties before placing them on the market. 239 According
to the Trust president, "cities should be in the best position to
control and determine the future of their communities by choos-
ing strategically important houses, purchasing and rehabilitating
them." 240 Wells Fargo, a voluntary participant of the program,
said it was selling foreclosed properties to responsible parties,
noting that putting occupants back in abandoned and vacant
properties was crucial for the recovery of the housing market. 241
Similar redevelopment programs by both local nonprofits and
state or city governments are currently in execution, utilizing
NSP242 funding. NSP, or Neighborhood Stabilization Programs,
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Program to Address Growing Bank Foreclosure Properties,
EFORECLOSURE MAGAZINE (Jul. 3, 2010), http://www.eforeclosuremagazine.
comforeclosure-help/program-to-address-growing-bank-foreclosure-proper
ties.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 The Neighborhood Stabilization Program was established for the purpose
of stabilizing communities that have suffered from foreclosures and abandon-
ment. NSP1 references NSP funds authorized under Division B, Title III of
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were first enacted under the Housing and Economic Recovery
Act of 2008 to provide grants to mitigate the negative impact of
the nation's economic decline and housing market collapse.243
To date, HUD has awarded $3.92 billion in NSP1 grants,244 $1.93
billion in NSP2 grants,245 and another $1 billion in NSP3
grants. 246 Under NSP1, grantees have 18 months from the date
HUD signed their grant agreements to obligate these funds and
four years to expend allocations. 247 NSP2 is a three year pro-
gram, where 50% of grant money must be spent in the first two
years and the total must be spent by the end of the third year.248
Lastly, under NSP3, grantees have two years from the date
HUD signed their grant to expend 50% of the funds, and three
the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) of 2008, and provides
grants to all states and selected local governments on a formula basis. NSP2
references NSP funds authorized under the American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act (the Recovery Act) of 2009, and provides grants to states, local
governments, nonprofits and a consortium of nonprofit entities on a competi-
tive basis. NSP-TA is a $50 million allocation available for technical assis-
tance providers to NSP grantees. Neighborhood Stabilization Program
Grants, HUD.Gov, http://hud.gov/offices/cpd/communitydevelopment/prog
rams/neighborhoodspg (last visited Mar. 3, 2011).
243 Id.
244 News Release, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Preston Allocates Nearly $4 Billion to Stabilize Neighborhoods in states and
Local Communities Hard-Hit by Foreclosure (Sep. 26, 2008), available at
http://archives.hud.gov/news/2008/pr08-148.cfm.
245 Neighborhood Stabilization Program 2, HUD.GOV, http://hud.gov/offices/
cpd/communitydevelopment/programs/neighborhoodspg/arrafactsheet.cfm
(last visited Mar. 3, 2011).
246 Neighborhood Stabilization Program 3, HUD.GOV, http://hud.gov/offices/
cpd/communitydevelopment/programs/neighborhoodspg/nsp3.cfm (last vis-
ited Mar. 3, 2011).
247 Neighborhood Stabilization Program 1, HUD.GOV, http://www.hud.gov/
offices/cpd/communitydevelopment/programs/neighborhoodspg/nspl.cfm
(last visited Mar. 3, 2011).
248 DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, NOTICE OF
FUND AVAILABILITY (NOFA) FOR THE NEIGHBORHOOD STABILIZATION
PROGRAM 2 UNDER THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT
67-8 (2009), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/communitydevelop
ment/programs/neighborhoodspg/pdf/nsp2_nofa.pdf.
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years to expend the entire amount. 249 Non-profit developers and
agencies should take advantage of these funds to rehabilitate
and revitalize their local neighborhoods.250 The Boston Commu-
nity Bank has been one of the first to take advantage of some of
these programs in its Stabilizing Urban Neighborhoods (SUN)
initiative.251
CONCLUSION
While the PTFA marks an important first step in mitigating
the negative impact to tenants affected by the foreclosure crisis,
more needs to be done on individual state and local levels. 252
The PTFA alone has been ineffective in practice, primarily due
to tenants' lack of knowledge, the inaccessibility to courts, and
the absence of enforcement mechanisms for violations of the
law. States such as Massachusetts and Minnesota have created
unique protections and given the PTFA effect, while states such
as Florida have only been in minimal compliance. The PTFA is
by no means a discrete mechanism in solving today's foreclosure
problems, but should be considered in conjunction with
249 Program 3, supra note 246.
250 There are a number of grantees that non-profit developers and agencies
can seek out. See Neighborhood Stabilization Program Resources Exchange -
NSP Grantees, HUDNSPHELP.INFO, http://hudnsphelp.info/index.cfm?do=view
GranteeAreaResults (last visited Mar. 3, 2011).
251 See supra Part IV(A).
252 States are, after all, "laboratories" for policy experiments:
"To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a
grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be
fraught with serious consequences to the Nation. It is one of
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single coura-
geous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory;
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to
the rest of the country."
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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other legislation,253 government programs, 254 and grassroots
initiatives.255
In the center of Brickell, Miami, home to the largest concen-
tration of international banks in the United States,25 6 newly con-
structed, vacant, high-rise condo buildings shimmer in the
skyline. 257 As the sun rises from the Atlantic, the buildings cast a
long, gloomy shadow westward towards 1-95. There, under the
shade of the interstate highway bridge, the homeless pace up
253 See, e.g., H.R. 1728, 111th Cong. (2009). This bill directs HUD to estab-
lish grant programs for low and moderate homeowners and tenants to obtain
legal assistance associated with foreclosure, prescribes tenant protection
measures in case of foreclosures, and authorizes state attorneys general to
enforce the tenant protections set forth in the Act.
254 The Federal Housing Administration has a program, called the "occupied
conveyance program," that provides at least 60 days notice before eviction
and a right for some homeowners and tenants to remain in a property after it
is transferred to FHA. The program permits residents with temporary, per-
manent, or long-term illness or injury to remain for some period of time after
the lender has made a claim and the property is transferred to FHA. See, e.g.,
24 C.F.R. §203.674 (1991). See also, Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §§ 101-102, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008)(requiring
Treasury Secretary to work with federal entities that hold troubled mortgages
to allow tenants to remain for the term of their leases).
255 See supra Part IV.B.
256 Brickell is the financial district of Miami, often referred to as the "Man-
hattan of the South," and houses the largest concentration of international
banks in the U.S., mostly along Brickell Avenue. See Brickell - Welcome to
Brickell/Financial District, HOMES.POINT2.CoM, http://homes.point2.com/
Neighborhood/US/Florida/Miami-Dade-County/Miami/Brickell-Real-Estate-
Agent.aspx (last visited Apr. 25, 2010).
257 Of the 2,744 properties for sale in the Brickell area, approximately 1,800
are owned by developers, and despite leasing these developer owned proper-
ties, empty condos still outnumber occupied condos. See Rachel Gomez,
Uneven prospects for Brickell, ALLBUSINESS (Jun. 24, 2009), http://www.
allbusiness.com/real-estate/commercial-residential-property/1 253 4975-1.html.
Cf. Dick Hogan, Sole occupant of 32-story Fort Myers condo wants out,
NEWS-PRESS.COM (Mar. 8, 2010, 9:02 PM), http://www.news-press.com/article/
20100308/NEWS01 10/3080347/1075/Sole-occupant-of-32-story-Fort-Myers-
condo-wants-out.
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and down near the highway ramps, begging for change. 258 In
other areas of the city, entire homeless camps or shanty towns
have come and gone over the past few years.259 In 2010, Miami
was ranked the leading U.S. city in economic free-fall, with
alarming foreclosure rates and a deepening foreclosure mar-
ket.260 The result, however, is a conundrum, as the increasing
masses of the homeless gaze eastward towards a rising skyline of
vacant housing.
258 See Rafael Olmeda, Homeless man struck, killed by tractor-trailer in
Deerfield, FHP says, SUN SENTINEL (Apr. 2, 2010), available at http://articles.
sun-sentinel.com/2010-04-02/news/fl-deerfield-fatal-crash-20100401 1_tractor
-trailer-struck-fhp.
259 See e.g., Kathie Klarrenich, The Battle Over Miami's Shanty Town, TIME
MAGAZINE, Jan. 18, 2007, available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/arti
cle/0,8599,1580473,00.html; Damien Cave, Roadside Camp for Miami Sex Of-
fenders Leads to Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 9, 2009), available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/07/10/us/lOoffender.html.
260 Median home prices in Miami have fallen 38% since 2007, and the city's
11% unemployment rate is well above the national average. Francesca Levy,
Ten U.S. Cities in Free Fall, FORBES MAGAZINE (Apr. 9, 2010), available at
http://www.forbes.com/2010/04/09/cities-top-ten-lifestyle-real-estate-unemplo
yment-home-prices.html.
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